Facilitating COVID responses: Rao Mai Ting Gun (No One Left Behind) scheme

To protect against the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Thai Government introduced broad social protection measures, valued at nearly USD12 billion. The first measure was the Rao Mai Ting Gun or “No One Left Behind”, which provided a monthly transfer of 5,000 THB per person  to informal or self-employed workers outside of agriculture for three months. The second measure was similar and also targeted farmers. The third measure provided a top-up of THB1,000 per month for three months starting July 2020 to people eligible for the State Welfare Card (SWC), a basic income security for low-income earners, as well as beneficiaries of the existing pre-COVID allowances for the older persons, persons with disabilities and children. These measures and existing social insurance schemes supported 42.4 million Thais (covering some 60 per cent of the population).1

The Rao Mai Ting Gun, rapidly reach new beneficiaries, of which many were self-employed and informal workers, often not poor enough to qualify for poverty-target support but at the same time excluded from social insurance schemes such as unemployment benefits. The scheme accepted on-demand applications via a website, which was subsequently combined with physical applications at state-owned banks. To verify eligibility, the program used ID-enabled integration of various databases aimed at reducing duplication, improving coordination and ultimately broadening the coverage. This included cross-verification against farmer databases and social security databases. Those assessed eligible for the Rao Mai Ting Gun were also cross-verified to identify those eligible for top-up payments under existing support schemes.

The government was able to reach segments of the population who were previously invisible to the social protection system by leveraging the strong foundations of the National ID system and existing information systems. This built on a previous similar interoperability-based strategies, used for expanding universal health coverage. Early evidence indicates that the Rao Mai Ting Gun was generally received by those in need, with only 13 per cent of the recipients falling into the highest income quintile.2

In comparison with international COVID-19 social protection responses, Rao Mai Ting Gun’s had fewer challenges and include initial stages of the roll-out:

  • With an on-demand approach, i.e., where anyone is allowed to self-register into the program, the Government significantly underestimated the demand, resulting in service disruptions. Compared to the government’s initial and revised coverage targets of 3 million and 9 million beneficiaries respectively, the program received 28.8 million applications.3
  • Many applicants were mis-identified as farmers. This caused confusion, which was further aggravated by the lack of transparent outreach and communications regarding the eligibility assessment process. The option to appeal the decision online helped mitigate applicants’ concerns to some extent. In retrospect, a single program may have been easier to communicate and administratively less complex. 
  • Although registration first took a web-only approach, inadequate access to technology and weak digital literacy led to opening of physical registration windows at state-owned banks. Civil society organizations, such as HomeNet Thailand, were instrumental in mediating access to digital social protection delivery systems. 
  • Without a tried and tested automated protocol for interoperability, the protocol followed manual data matching, affecting timely enrolment.

Despite these challenges, this experience demonstrated that with strong foundational systems in terms of identification, population registry, internet penetration and digital information systems, Thailand was well-placed to extend social protection to some 15 million informal workers. The large majority of the population is likely now registered for some form of social protection. These social protection information systems were complemented by the population registry and other digital information systems related to civil servants, taxpayers, land, vehicles, education and health, providing unique opportunities to reach informal workers.

Key to streamlining the bottlenecks faced by Rao Mai Ting Gun will be overcoming policy and programmatic fragmentation across ministries to build seamless interoperability between well-functioning and credible information systems. A dynamically updated virtual registry, i.e., a registry that automatically integrates data from various information systems at set intervals, can help maintain up-to-date data and enable speedier identification of beneficiaries during shocks, whilst safeguarding data privacy.

 

Further reading:

 

Footnote

  1. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35695
  2. https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Enduring-the-Pandemic-Covid-19-Impact-on-Thailand-Livlihoods-Sept-2020.pdf
  3. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35695

 

Componente
Coordination and Delivery Systems
Coordination and Delivery Systems: Responding to COVID