Facilitating COVID responses: Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) scheme

As part of Georgia’s COVID-19 Anti-Crisis Plan, the Government made a budgetary allocation of USD31 million towards social protection. These measures included the adaptation of the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) scheme as well as the introduction of new temporary measures to support formal and informal workers.

As of October 2018, the social registry covered 316,039 households (around 30 per cent of all households), of which 121,345 households received the TSA.1 As part of the COVID-19 measures, the TSA was automatically extended to an additional 70,000 families for six months.2 These families were already recorded in the registry but previously did not qualify for the benefit.

In addition to this automatic expansion, the on-demand registration system of the TSA at the Social Services Agency (SSA) ensured that the TSA responded to the households’ new circumstances. At the start of the pandemic, it was estimated that 38,000 new beneficiaries would apply and be assessed eligible through the on-demand system.3

Emerging evidence indicates that this system was responsive. Between January 2020 and December 2020, the number of eligible beneficiaries in the registry increased by 42,000.4 Typically, applicants are required to visit the local SSA office to register, which is followed by two home visits by social agents for verification and validation. During the pandemic, online applications were made available and home visits were postponed. For existing beneficiaries, periodic recertification were suspended, allowing beneficiaries to remain in the scheme for an extended duration.

Although the TSA was adapted to address increased poverty and vulnerability, its implementation faced a few bottlenecks:

  • The data collected by the TSA are used as a proxy for identifying income loss. However, the welfare scores are linked to assets rather than income, making the system less effective in the context of a sudden economic downturn. This is supported by the fact that even before the crisis, only half of those in the lowest income quintile were covered by the TSA. 
  • Beyond this design limitation, the pandemic caused new bottlenecks in the implementation. Despite the relaxation of processes, the average time for enrolment was one month. One of the reasons for this was the inadvertent impact of the suspension of home visits. Th declines in earnings of social agents resulted in strikes. 
  • Insufficient outreach and communication of the changes in the scheme led to slower uptake of benefits. For instance, although the decree was clear that receiving emergency assistance did not mandate a revision of the welfare score in the registry, the absence of wider dissemination of the rules resulted in mistaken fears among informal workers that receipt of an emergency benefit would disqualify them from a range of other benefits.

The challenges faced during this crisis highlight important areas for future reform. First, the registry will need to incorporate different proxy variables that can be used to identify new recipients and expand coverage during large-scale shocks. Second, the availability and incentive structure of the TSA will need to be reviewed to ensure that single window structures ease beneficiary burden. Finally, while there is policy-level coherence across various programs, clear communication campaigns are necessary to give citizens clarity regarding their entitlements.

 

Further reading:

 

Footnote

  1. https://www.unicef.org/georgia/reports/detailed-analysis-targeted-social-assistance-and-child-poverty
  2. https://www.unicef.org/georgia/media/4896/file/social_protection_system_Readiness.pdf
  3. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/949581588712278110/pdf/Georgia-Emergency-COVID-19-Response-Project.pdf
  4. http://ssa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=&sec_id=1476

 

Componente
Coordination and Delivery Systems
Coordination and Delivery Systems: Responding to COVID